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| If you can sniff the   packets coming out of an Asterisk system, you can extract the audio from the RTP streams.   This data can be fed offline to a speech processing system, which can listen for   keywords such as “credit card number” or “PIN”, and present that data to someone who has an   interest in it. The stream can also be evaluated to see if there are  DTMF tones embedded in it,  which is   dangerous because  many services ask   for password and credit   card information input via the dialpad. In business, strategic in- formation could also   be gleaned from being able to capture and evaluate audio. Using Secure RTP can   combat this problem by encrypting the RTP streams; however, Asterisk does not   support SRTP as of this writing. Work is under way to provide SRTP support (a patch   exists in the trunk release, but it is not known as of this writing whether this will be   back-ported to 1.4). | 
| Spoofing | 
| In the traditional   telephone network, it is very difficult to successfully adopt someone else’s identity. Your   activities can (and will) be traced back to you, and the authorities will  quickly    put  an  end to    the  fun.  In the    world  of IP,  it is    much  easier to  remain anonymous. As such, it   is no stretch to imagine that hordes of enterprising criminals will only be too happy   to make calls to your credit card company or bank, pretending to be you. If a   trusted mechanism is not discovered to combat spoofing, we will quickly learn that we cannot   trust VoIP calls. | 
| What   Can Be Done? | 
| The first thing to   keep in mind when considering security on a VoIP system is that VoIP is based on network   protocols, and needs be evaluated from that perspective. This is not to  say    that  traditional  telecom    security should  be ignored, but   we  need  to pay attention to the   underlying network. | 
| Basic network security | 
| One of the most   effective things that can be done is to secure access to the voice network. The use of firewalls   and VLANs are examples of how this can be achieved. By default, the voice network   should be accessible only to those things that have a need. For ex- ample, if you do not   have any softphones in use, do not allow client PCs access to the voice network. | 
|  Unless there is a need to have voice and   data on the same | 
| Segregating voice and   data traffic. | 
| network, there may be   some value in keeping them separate (this can have other benefits as well, such as   simplifying QoS configurations). It is not unheard of to build the in- ternal  voice    network  on  a    totally  separate  LAN,    using  existing  CAT3    cabling  and terminating on   inexpensive network switches. It can be less expensive too. | 
